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1 
BATTLE TO DETERMINE THE MEANING OF THE 
MAGNUSON-STEVENS FISHERIES 
CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT 
REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2006: A SURVEY OF 
RECENT JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
Shaun M. Gehan & Michele Hallowell 1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
During waning hours of its lame duck session, the 109th Congress 
passed the first major overhaul of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act2 (“MSA”) since the 1996 Sustainable 
Fisheries Act (“SFA”).3  President Bush signed the Magnuson-Stevens 
Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization of 2006 
(“Reauthorization Act”) on January 12, 2007, ushering a new and 
challenging era in fisheries management.4  These amendments effected 
deep changes to the nation’s fishery management laws by, among many 
other things, strengthening the MSA’s conservation objectives and 
fostering increased use of controversial, market-based fisheries 
management systems.  The regulated fishing community, non-
                                            
 1. Shaun M. Gehan and Michele Hallowell are attorneys with the law firm Kelley 
Drye & Warren, LLP in Washington, D.C.  Each received their J.D. from the University 
of Maine School of Law and extensively practice in the field of fisheries management 
and regulation. 
 2. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1891(d) (2006).  For a history of the original Magnuson-
Stevens Act, including its purpose and structure, see James William Merrill, Trawling 
For Meaning: A New Standard For “Best Scientific Information Available” in the 
Magnuson-Stevens Fisheries Conservation Act, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 475, 482-85 (2010-
11). 
 3. Sustainable Fisheries Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–297, 110 Stat. 3559 
[hereinafter SFA]. 
 4. See Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization 
Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–479, 120 Stat. 3575 (2007) [hereinafter Reauthorization 
Act]. 
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governmental organizations, and the government itself are still adjusting 
to the new regime. 
As is typical following major changes in law, the Reauthorization 
Act has spurred a great deal of litigation.5  The reason is simple; the 
legislative process is one of compromise and negotiation, often fostering 
vague statutory language and contradictory mandates.  Congressional 
give-and-take that ensures clarity is a rare commodity in Washington.  
Resulting ambiguity leaves room for interpretation, initially by the 
administering agency—in this case, the National Marine Fisheries 
Service (“NMFS”)6—and subsequently by litigants offering competing 
interpretations of the new law’s (and its implementing regulations’) 
meaning and reach. 
This cycle followed in the wake of the SFA.7  Major litigation tested 
the meaning and limits of the SFA’s new requirement to minimize 
bycatch and create a “standardized bycatch reporting methodology,”8 its 
essential fish habitat provision,9 and the deadlines the law created for 
ending overfishing and rebuilding stocks.10  As explained below, a very 
similar process is now underway, with many early cases beginning to 
                                            
 5. In addition to the cases discussed herein, there are at least two additional cases at 
the briefing stage, including Oceana, Inc. v. Bryson, No. 11-1896 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 28, 
2011) (challenging the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council’s Omnibus 
Amendment to Establish Annual Catch Limits and Accountability Measures), and 
Oceana, Inc. v. Bryson, No. 11-6257 (N.D. Cal. filed Dec. 13, 2011) (challenging aspects 
of the Pacific Fishery Management Council’s Amendment 13 to the Coastal Pelagic 
Species Fishery Management Plan on various Reauthorization Act grounds).   
 6. NMFS is part of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(“NOAA”), which itself is part of the Commerce Department.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1511 
(1993) & accompanying notes (stating that Reorganization Plan No. 4 created NOAA 
within the Department of Commerce, transferring to it the functions of the Bureau of 
Commercial Fisheries, which became NMFS); see also Northeast Fisheries Science 
Center, Fisheries Historical Timeline: Historical Highlights 1970’s, 
http://www.nefsc.noaa.gov/history/timeline/1970.html (last visited July 20, 2012). 
 7. See SFA, Pub. L. No. 104–297, 110 Stat. 3559. 
 8. See id. § 108(a)(7); see also Conservation Law Found. v. Evans, 209 F. Supp. 2d 
1, 11-15 (D.D.C. 2001) (“Bycatch refers to fish caught incidentally while a fisher is 
trying to catch fish of a different species.” (citing 142 Cong. Rec. S10810 (daily ed.  
Sept. 18, 1996)) (footnote omitted)); Oceana, Inc. v. Locke, 670 F.3d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 
2011); Oceana, Inc. v. Evans, 384 F. Supp. 2d 203, 231-37 (D.D.C. 2005); Oceana, Inc. 
v. Evans, No. Civ.A.04-0811(ESH) 04-0811, 2005 WL 555416, at **37-43 (D.D.C. Mar. 
9, 2005). 
 9. See SFA § 108(a)(3). 
 10. See id. § 109(e); see also Conservation Law Found. v. Evans, supra note 8. 
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define the meaning and scope of new provisions of the Reauthorization 
Act.11   
Few would argue that the Reauthorization Act changes are 
insignificant.  Samuel Rauch, acting head of NMFS, stated:  “With 
[Reauthorization Act mandated] annual catch limits in place this year for 
all domestic fish populations and the continued commitment of 
fishermen to rebuild the stocks they rely on, we’re making even greater 
progress in ending overfishing and rebuilding stocks around the 
nation.”12  While many in the fishing industry are heartened by this 
progress, the cost has been high and there is a feeling that the law’s 
flexibility is too rarely employed.  Conversely, environmental groups 
frequently challenge the agency for not fully living up to the Act’s 
requirements.13  The stakes in legal battles over Reauthorization Act 
changes are high.  Some of the most important of these are discussed 
below. 
II.  THE MAGNUSON-STEVENS FISHERY CONSERVATION AND 
MANAGEMENT ACT 
The modern United States fishery management regime was created 
in 1976.14  The MSA (then simply known as the “Magnuson Act”) 
created eight quasi-legislative bodies known as regional fishery 
management councils comprising citizens “knowledgeable regarding the 
conservation and management, or the commercial or recreational harvest, 
of the fishery resources,” the head of each state’s marine fisheries 
agency, and the NMFS regional administrator.15  Councils must respond 
to declarations that stocks of fish are overfished by preparing a fishery 
management plan (“FMP”) or plan amendment designed “to end 
overfishing in the fishery and to rebuild affected stocks of fish.”16  
Recommended management plans and implementing regulations are 
reviewed for consistency with applicable law by NMFS, as the 
Commerce Secretary’s designee.17  NMFS may only accept, reject, or 
partially reject these recommended plans, amendments, and 
                                            
 11. See infra Part I. 
 12. Press Release, NMFS, Annual NOAA report shows a record number of rebuilt 
fisheries (May 14, 2012), available at  http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/mediacenter/ 
2012/05/15_statusofstocks.htm. 
 13. See, e.g., Oceana Inc., v. Locke, 670 F.3d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 14. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1976).  
 15. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1852(a)(1), (b)(1)-(b)(2)(A) (2006).   
 16. Id. § 1854(e)(3).   
 17. Id. §§ 1854(a)-(b). 
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regulations.18  “Any fishery management plan prepared, and any 
regulation promulgated to implement any such plan, shall be consistent 
with [ten] national standards for fishery conservation and 
management.”19  Chief among these is National Standard 1:  
“Conservation and management measures shall prevent overfishing 
while achieving, on a continuing basis, the optimum yield from each 
fishery for the United States fishing industry.”20 
III.  MAJOR CHANGES IMPLEMENTED BY THE REAUTHORIZATION ACT 
The Reauthorization Act was a sweeping piece of legislation, dealing 
with everything from tsunami warnings21 and polar bears,22 to data 
collection and cooperative research.23  Here we focus on Title I, which 
changed the procedural and substantive aspects of the nation’s fishery 
management system under the MSA in fundamentally important ways.24 
A.  Strengthened Economic and Social Considerations in Fisheries 
Management 
While this bill’s conservation measure received the most attention, 
the Reauthorization Act also addressed concerns relating to the social 
                                            
 18. Id. §§ 1854(a)(3), (b)(1)(B).  “[W]hen the Secretary is presented with proposed 
amendments and regulations, he does not have the independent authority to, sua sponte, 
add a regulation that is inconsistent with the proposal from the Council.”  Connecticut v. 
Daley, 53 F. Supp. 2d 147, 160-61 (D. Conn. 1999) (citing Midwater Trawlers Coop. v. 
Mosbacher, 727 F. Supp. 12, 16 (D.D.C. 1989)). 
 19. 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a) (2006). 
 20. Id. § 1851(a)(1).  Among the most important of the others, National Standard 2, 
provides that “[c]onservation and management measures shall be based upon the best 
scientific information available”; National Standard 4 prohibits discrimination “between 
residents of different States,” and requires that, if allocations are made, they “be (A) fair 
and equitable to all such fishermen; (B) reasonably calculated to promote conservation; 
and (C) carried out in such manner that no particular individual, corporation, or other 
entity acquires an excessive share of such privileges”; National Standard 5 requires 
managers “consider efficiency in the utilization of fishery resources,” but disallows 
measures that “have economic allocation as [their] sole purpose”; National Standard 9 
requires minimization of bycatch, or incidental harvest of non-target species, and the 
minimization of mortality of such species that cannot be avoided; and National Standard 
10 requires the “protection of human life at sea.”  Id. § 1851(a)(2), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(9), 
(a)(10). 
 21. See Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 109–479, 120 Stat. 3575 (2007). 
 22. Id. at 3660. 
 23. Id. at 3611. 
 24. See id. at 3575. 
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and economic impacts of fisheries management.25  National Standard 8 
provides that, consistent with the duty to prevent overfishing and rebuild 
depleted stocks, conservation and management measures must “take into 
account the importance of fishery resources to fishing communities,” 
“provide for [their] sustained participation[,]” and “to the extent 
practicable, minimize adverse economic impacts on such 
communities.”26  The Reauthorization Act increased the rigor of the 
social and economic inquiry into the “importance of fishery resources to 
fishing communities” by specifying that it be conducted “utilizing 
economic and social data that meet the requirements of” National 
Standard 2, the best science standard.27 
In terms of substance, this new language may not add much to 
the councils’ or NMFS’ duties under the law.  That Congress felt 
it necessary to add this clause, however, underscores the 
importance it attached to a more rigorous impacts analysis.  
Senator Ted Stevens explained that the Reauthorization Act was 
meant to strengthen the role of science in council decision 
making . . . . It specifies that the role of the Scientific and 
Statistical Committees SSCs is to provide their councils with 
ongoing scientific advice needed for management decisions, 
which may include recommendations on acceptable biological 
catch or optimum yield, annual catch limits, or other mortality 
limits. The SSCs are expected to advise the councils on a variety 
of other issues, including stock status and health, bycatch, habitat 
status, and socio-economic impacts.28 
Congress also expanded the scope of the required “fishery impact 
statement” to accompany every fishery management plan or 
amendment.29  It is meant to ensure that fishery managers consider the 
impacts of regulations on “participants in the fisheries and fishing 
                                            
 25. See id. 
 26. 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(8); see also AML Int’l Inc. v. Daley, 107 F. Supp. 2d 90, 103 
(D. Mass. 2000) (interpreting National Standard 9, stating, “All other things being equal, 
however, where two alternatives achieve similar conservation goals, the alternative which 
provides the greater potential for sustained participation of communities and minimizes 
the adverse economic impacts is preferred.” (citing 50 C.F.R. § 600.345(b))). 
 27. Reauthorization Act § 101(a), 120 Stat. at 3579 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 
1851(a)(8)). 
 28. 152 CONG. REC. S.6050 (daily ed. Jun. 19, 2006) (statement of Sen. Stevens). 
 29. Reauthorization Act § 101(b), 120 Stat. at 3579 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 
1853(a)(9)).   
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communities affected by the plan or amendment.”30  In this respect, a 
fishery impact statement is analogous to an environmental impact 
statement under the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”),31 and 
is even more so in light of the Reauthorization Act changes.   
Specifically, the bill added a requirement that such impact statements 
“analyze the likely effects, if any, including the cumulative conservation, 
economic, and social impacts, of the conservation and management 
measures on, and possible mitigation measures for” regulated fishermen 
and their communities.32  Thus, like an environmental impact statement 
under NEPA, the MSA now requires an assessment of both cumulative 
impacts and a consideration of alternatives, albeit in the context of 
impacts on the regulated community.33  Congress clearly wanted councils 
to take a hard look at the impacts of recommended conservation 
measures that other parts of the law ensured would become more 
onerous. 
B.  Strengthened the Role of Science in Fisheries Management 
The regional fishery management councils established under the 
MSA are required to establish a scientific and statistical committee 
(“SSC”) to “assist . . . in the development,  collection, evaluation, and 
peer review of such statistical, biological, economic, social, and other 
scientific information as is relevant to such Council’s development and 
amendment of any fishery management plan.”34   The Reauthorization 
Act expanded the mandate of the SSCs by, for example, allowing the 
committees to undertake peer review of such information and more 
specifically defining the SSC’s duties.35   
These now explicitly include recommending levels of acceptable 
biological catch, overfishing limits, rebuilding targets, and evaluations of 
a stock’s status.36  These duties are not necessarily new—this is 
effectively the function SSCs have long served.  However, these 
provisions take on new import as the Reauthorization Act sets the 
                                            
 30. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(9)(A). 
 31. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2006). 
 32. Reauthorization Act § 101(b), 120 Stat.  at 3575 (2007). 
 33. See Oceana, Inc. v. Evans, No. Civ.A.04-0811(ESH), 2005 WL 555416, at **37-
43 (D.D.C. March 9, 2005)(citing 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.14 (alternatives) and 1502.2 
(cumulative impacts)). 
 34. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(g)(1)(A) (2006). 
 35. See Reauthorization Act § 103(b)(1), 120 Stat. at 3580 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 
1852(b)). 
 36. Id. (codified at 16. U.S.C. § 1852(g)(1)(B)). 
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“fishing level recommendations” that the SSC makes as the mandatory 
upper limit on catch levels that a council may adopt.37  This has added 
importance to the role of SSCs and, based on personal experience, raised 
the stakes of SSC meetings for the regulated community and interested 
parties.  The increased role of science as a determinative element in 
fisheries management has also placed extreme pressure on the data 
collection and fishery stock assessment process.38 
C.  Heightened Conservation Requirements 
By adding a single sentence to the mandatory requirements of a 
fishery management or amendment, Congress begat a revolution in 
fisheries management.  Under the Reauthorization Act, councils are 
required to “establish a mechanism for specifying annual catch limits in 
the plan (including a multiyear plan), implementing regulations, or 
annual specifications, at a level such that overfishing does not occur in 
the fishery, including measures to ensure accountability.”39  Annual catch 
limits (“ACLs”) and accountability measures (“AMs”) have come to 
dominate the battlefield over fisheries management, both at the council 
level and in litigation, as discussed below.40 
Coupled with the provision noted above (regarding the prevention of 
management bodies setting ACLs above those levels recommended by 
their SSCs), this provision has done more to put stocks on a sustainable 
footing than any other reform over the MSA’s thirty-six year history.  In 
essence, while stopping short of absolutely requiring catch levels be 
managed by quota, the ACL requirement has made formerly ubiquitous 
“input controls” – measures such as gear restrictions (like minimum 
                                            
 37. See id. § 103(c)(3) (requiring councils to “develop annual catch limits for each of 
its managed fisheries that may not exceed the fishing level recommendations of its 
scientific and statistical committee or the peer review process established under 
subsection (g)”); see also infra Part I.C (discussing annual catch limits). 
 38. See, e.g., Don Cuddy, Scallopers urge feds to rework yellowtail survey, NEW 
BEDFORD STANDARD TIMES, July 19, 2012, 
http://www.southcoasttoday.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20120719/NEWS/12071988
1 (describing industry letter to NMFS urging improved data collection for an important 
flounder stock). 
 39. Reauthorization Act § 104(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 3584 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 
1853(a)(15)).   
 40. See infra pp. 14-16. 
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mesh sizes), fishing season limitations, and area restrictions41 – less 
feasible strategies for managing stocks.   
AMs have also had a profound effect on management.  Defined as 
“management controls to prevent ACLs . . . from being exceeded, and to 
correct or mitigate overages of the ACL if they occur,”42 AMs have both 
proactive and reactive elements.  Within a fishing season, the measure 
might be as simple as closing a fishery when a quota is projected to be 
reached, or lowering catch limits to account for uncertainty in calculating 
total harvest during the year.43  Reactively, AMs may call for “payback,” 
or a reduction in the next year’s harvest if catch limits are exceeded.44  
The sufficiency of AMs for a given management plan has become a ripe 
point of dispute in litigation.45 
Congress accelerated the pace of these changes by requiring the 
establishment of ACLs and AMs for overfished (depleted) stocks or 
stocks harvested at an unsustainable rate (i.e., those subject to 
“overfishing”) within three years of adoption of the Reauthorization Act, 
and four years for all others.46   
D.  Limited Access Privilege Programs 
Finally, for purposes of this review, Congress added a new section 
entitled “Limited access privilege programs.”47  This term, LAPP for 
short, is enshrined in statute, but was not a term of art prior to the 
Reauthorization Act, nor is it used in the discussions of fisheries 
management policy today.  Rather, the phrase “catch share programs” 
has come to cover the types of management strategies the law considers 
LAPPs.48  “[C]atch share programs [is] a generic term describing 
programs that allocate a specific portion of the total allowable catch to 
individuals, cooperatives, communities, or other entities.”49  The 
                                            
 41. See, e.g., Shannon Carroll, Comment, Sector Allocation: A Misguided Solution, 17 
OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 163, 169 (2011); see also Oceana, Inc. v. Locke, 2011 WL 
6357795 at *4; Madeiros v. Vincent, 431 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 42. 50 C.F.R. § 600.310(g)(1). 
 43. See id. § 600.310(g)(2). 
 44. Id. § 600.310(g)(3). 
 45. See, e.g., Oceana, Inc. v. Locke, 831 F. Supp. 2d 95, 99 (2011). 
 46. Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 109–479, § 104(b)(1), 120 Stat. at 3575, 3584 
(2007). 
 47. Id. § 106, 120 Stat. at 3586 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)). 
 48. See, e.g., Eric Schwaab, The Magnuson Act Thirty-Five Years Later, 17 ROGER 
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 14, 18 (2012). 
 49. Id.   
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extensive new LAPP provision sets forth substantive and procedural 
requirements for such programs.50 
Among the species of catch share programs is a special breed known 
as the individual transferable quota (“ITQ”) or individual fishing quota 
(“IFQ”).51  Always controversial, these rights-based management 
strategies vest individual fishermen with the privilege to individually 
harvest a fixed portion of an annual quota and, when transferable, to sell 
or lease that allocation to others.52  Fears of excessive consolidation of 
fishing privileges in fewer hands and high barriers to entry for young 
fishermen, among other concerns, led Congress to establish a 
moratorium on new ITQ programs as part of the 1996 SFA.53  By its 
terms, the moratorium expired in 2000,54 but the controversy did not 
abate.   
The Reauthorization Act’s LAPP provision represents Congress 
reckoning with these types of management systems.  The law attempts to 
lessen the concerns of excessive concentration via a suite of initial 
allocation standards, provisions to assist new entrants in obtaining 
shares, excessive share limitations, and the creation of a purchase 
assistance program.55  In a parochial nod to regions with strong anti-ITQ 
sentiments, the Act also included referendum provisions for new ITQ 
programs sought to be established by the Gulf of Mexico and New 
England Fishery Management Councils.56  As both cases like City of 
New Bedford v. Locke,57 and recent congressional action58 show, 
Congress’ attempt to allay concerns has not been entirely successful. 
                                            
 50. See 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a) (2006). 
 51. See Alliance Against IFQs v. Brown, 84 F.3d 343, 345 (9th Cir. 1996); see also R. 
Quentin Grafton, Individual Transferable Quotas: Theory and Practice, 6 REVIEWS IN 
FISH AND BIOLOGY 5, 5 (1996). 
 52. See Alliance, 84 F.3d at 345 (discussing the details of the halibut IFQ program). 
 53. See Carroll, supra note 41, at 177-78. 
 54. SFA, Pub. L. No. 104-297, § 108(e), 110 Stat. 3559 (1996). 
 55. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1853a(c)(5), (g). 
 56. Id. at § 1853a(c)(6)(D).  As an example of the regionalized nature of this 
provision, not only are only two of the eight regional councils required to hold a 
referendum among permit holders in the fishery, but the level of vote required to adopt 
the programs are different among the two.  In New England, it takes a 2/3 majority to 
approve an ITQ, while a simple majority can adopt such a program in the Gulf.  Id. at § 
1853a(c)(6)(D)(i).  
 57. No. 10–10789-RWZ, 2011 WL 2636863 (D. Mass. June 30, 2011). 
 58. A very temporary ban on expending funds on development or approval of LAPPs 
passed as a rider on the 2011 omnibus appropriations bill, H.R. 1473.  Pub. L. No. 112-
10, § 1349, 125 Stat. 57 (Apr. 15, 2011).  Other bills in the 112th Congress, such as the 
Saving Fishing Jobs Act of 2011 (H.R. 2772, 112th Cong. (2011-2012)), likewise create 
barriers to expansion of rights-based management efforts. 
10 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18:1 
 
IV.  REVIEW OF REAUTHORIZATION ACT CASES 
A.  Cases Involving the Reauthorization Act’s Catch Share Provisions 
1.  City of New Bedford v. Locke 
The first ITQ program in the United States, involving the relatively 
small and distinct surf clam and ocean quahog fishery, was jointly 
developed by the New England and Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management 
Councils in the late 1980s.59  Despite this early effort, resistance to 
rights-based management schemes, particularly by some participants in 
New England’s major fisheries—groundfish60 and scallops—has been 
strong.61  Because many fishermen in the region shared the view 
expressed by then Commissioner of the Maine Department of Marine 
Resources George LaPointe that “the implementation of [catch shares], 
or ITQs as they were previously known, would mean the end of the 
traditional character of the New England fleet,”62 it was almost thirty 
years after the pioneering surf clam ITQ program before a remotely 
similar management scheme was proposed for the region.63  
That program, codified through Amendment 16 to the Northeast 
Multispecies FMP and associated rulemakings, was at issue in City of 
                                            
 59. See Sea Watch Int’l v. Mosbacher, 762 F. Supp. 370, 373 (D.D.C. 1991) 
(discussing development of the surf clam ITQ program implemented in 1990); see also 
EUGENE H. BUCK, Individual Transferable Quotas in Fishery Management, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., 95-849 ENR (1995), available at http://cnie.org/NLE/ 
CRSreports/marine/mar-1.cfm.    
 60. Groundfish is a generic name for a suite of bottom-dwelling fish stocks, including 
cod, haddock, and a variety of flounders that are collectively managed under the New 
England Council’s Northeast Multispecies Fishery Management Plan (“FMP”).  See 
Associated Fisheries of Maine v. Daley, 127 F.3d 104, 107 n.2 (1st Cir. 1997) (citing 
Peter Shelley et al., The New England Fisheries Crisis: What Have We Learned?, 9 TUL. 
ENVTL. L. J. 221, 223 & n.4 (1996)); see also NEW ENGLAND FISHERY MANAGEMENT 
COUNCIL, http://www.nefmc.org/nemulti/index.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2012). 
 61. See Carroll, supra note 41, at 165, 181.   
 62. Id. at 181, n.151 (quoting Reauthorization of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & 
Transp., 109th Cong. 15 (2005) (statement of George LaPointe, Comm’r, Maine 
Department of Marine Resources)). 
 63. NORTHEAST MULTISPECIES FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN, AMENDMENT 16, 
http://www.nefmc.org/nemulti/planamen/Amend16/final%20amendment%2016/1.0_091
016_Final_Amendment_16.pdf (last visted Sept. 14, 2012). 
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New Bedford.64  In fact, the most basic question at issue in City of New 
Bedford was whether the “sectors” program established in Amendment 
16 fell within the MSA’s definition of a LAPP and was therefore subject 
to the special procedural requirements, including an industry referendum, 
the Reauthorization Act created.65 
Prior to Amendment 16, the New England groundfish fishery was 
primarily regulated through a limitation on the total amount of fishing 
time each permitted vessel could expend each year harvesting 
groundfish.66  This “days-at-sea” (“DAS”) program sought to reduce 
fishing pressure on overfished groundfish by limiting the number of days 
fishermen could expend in harvesting activities.67  This approach “has 
been partially effective; some overfished stocks have recovered while 
others have shown little or no improvement.”68  However, to meet the 
MSA’s rebuilding and overfishing objectives, NMFS “determined that 
dramatic decreases in fishing mortality are necessary” for the latter class 
of fish stocks.69 
The new sector system was designed to implement the newly 
established ACLs for New England groundfish stocks while also 
providing fishermen a means of adjusting economically to the 
dramatically lower catch limits.70  “Sectors are an alternative to days-at-
sea effort controls, whereby a group of fishermen jointly form a sector 
and are collectively assigned a catch limit, an ‘Annual Catch 
Entitlement’ (‘ACE’).”71  Each groundfish “permit holder is allocated a 
‘potential sector contribution’ (‘PSC’) based upon its landings history.”72  
“This is a proportional measure of the vessel’s landing history relative to 
the total landings over a given period of time for each stock.”73  Permit 
holders seeking to join a sector add their PSC to those of others in the 
sector, and the sum of all these contributions equates to that sector’s 
                                            
 64. See City of New Bedford v. Locke, No. 10–10789-RWZ, 2011 WL 2636863, at 
*2 (D. Mass. June 30, 2011) (describing the management program established by 
Amendment 16). 
 65. Id. at *3. 
 66. See Associated Fisheries of Maine, Inc. v. Daley, 127 F.3d 104, 108 (1st Cir. 
1997). 
 67. Id.   
 68. City of New Bedford, 2011 WL 2636863, at *2 (citation omitted). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id.; see also id. at *6 (“The Agency concluded that the sector program, which is 
not a conservation measure, would increase fishing efficiency and could ameliorate some 
of this harm.” ) (citations omitted). 
 71. Id. at *2. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. (citations omitted). 
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ACE, which may be traded with other sectors.74  The combination of all 
sectors’ ACE and the PSC that belong to vessels not choosing to join a 
sector, which becomes part of a common pool governed by DAS, is 
limited by the overall ACL for each of the New England groundfish 
species.75 
The basic elements of the Amendment 16 management system thus 
include: an individualized allocation of fishing privileges for each of the 
managed species based on a permit holder’s catch history; cooperative-
like structures given proportionate shares of an ACL that may be 
harvested by members or traded among sectors; and a “common pool” of 
vessels operating under DAS that is allocated its own proportion of the 
overall ACL for the various groundfish species based on the historical 
landings of the vessels choosing not to join a sector.76  The MSA, as 
amended by the Reauthorization Act, defines a “limited access privilege” 
as “a Federal permit, issued as part of a limited access system under [16 
U.S.C. § 1853a] to harvest a quantity of fish expressed by a unit or units 
representing a portion of the total allowable catch of the fishery that may 
be received or held for exclusive use by a person.”77 
By its terms, it would appear that the Amendment 16 sector program 
fits within the general definition of a LAPP.78  Whether this program 
could be considered an IFQ system is another question.  Notwithstanding 
the limited access privilege being a broader category than IFQ,79 the 
definitions are virtually identical.80  Distinguishing between the two, 
however, is important because the MSA’s referendum requirement for 
New England only applies to an FMP or an amendment “that creates an 
individual fishing quota program.”81  Thus, if Amendment 16 created an 
                                            
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. 16 U.S.C. § 1802(26)(A) (2006).  “Person” is defined as “any individual (whether 
or not a citizen or national of the United States), any corporation, partnership, 
association, or other entity (whether or not organized or existing under the laws of any 
State), and any Federal, State, local, or foreign government or any entity of any such 
government.”  Id. § 1802(36). 
 78. See id. § 1802(26). 
 79. See id. § 1802(26)(B) (LAP definition “includes individual fishing quotas”). 
 80. Compare id. § 1802(23) (defining IFQ in relevant part to mean “a Federal permit 
under a limited access system to harvest a quantity of fish, expressed by a unit or units 
representing a percentage of the total allowable catch of a fishery that may be received or 
held for exclusive use by a person”), with id. § 1802(26)(A).  The only difference is that 
the LAP definition specifies that the “limited access system” in question is the one “under 
section 303A.” See 16 U.S.C. § 1853a (2006). 
 81. Id. § 1853a(c)(6)(D)(i). 
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IFQ, as some plaintiffs in City of New Bedford argued, a referendum 
should have been held.82  Even if the sector program was not an IFQ, but 
still some other species of LAPP, other special procedural and 
substantive requirements added by the Reauthorization Act would 
apply.83  
NMFS and the Council denied that Amendment 16 created any form 
of LAPP.84  They argued that “fishermen are issued permits with an 
associated PSC, but that the PSC never operates as a limitation on how 
much the permit holder may catch and only acquires meaning when 
aggregated with other PSCs in a sector.”85  Further, while a particular 
“sector is, arguably, limited by an ACE to a quantity of fish within the 
meaning of the LAPP and IFQ definitions,” the sectors themselves are 
not issued a permit and thus do not meet the statutory LAP definition.86  
In short, the government argued that Amendment 16 created “no ‘permit 
. . . to harvest a quantity of fish,’” which it contended was the touchstone 
of a LAPP.87  
In what it deemed a “close call,” the court agreed with the New 
England Council and NMFS that Amendment 16’s sector program was 
neither a LAPP nor an IFQ.88  Ostensibly employing the Chevron89 
analysis, Judge Zobel determined that Congress had “explicitly left a gap 
for an agency to fill”90 and found she was “bound by the Agency’s 
informed conclusion, reached at Congress’ express direction after an 
extended and formal administrative process including a notice-and-
comment period.”91  More specifically to the plaintiff’s argument that a 
referendum was required, the court noted that Congress explicitly 
exempted sectors from this provision.92  
                                            
 82. City of New Bedford v. Locke, No. 10–10789-RWZ, 2011 WL 2636863, at *3 (D. 
Mass. June 30, 2011). 
 83. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 1853a(c)(1), (5), (7).   
 84. City of New Bedford, 2011 WL 2636863, at *4. 
 85. Id. (citations omitted). 
 86. Id. (citations omitted).  Note that the MSA defines only a “limited access 
privilege,” not a limited access privilege program.  Here, “LAP” refers to the former, 
“LAPP” to the latter. 
 87. Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1802(26) (2006)). 
 88. Id. at *4.  
 89. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 
(1984).  
 90. City of New Bedford, 2011 WL 2636863, at *3 (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 
467 U.S. at 843–44)). 
 91. Id. at *4.  
 92. Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(c)(6)(D)(vi)). 
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The decision that the sector program did not amount to an IFQ 
appears well founded.  Amendment 16 allowed for the creation of 
cooperative-like entities that enable fishermen to pool and manage a 
fixed amount of quota in a manner substantially different from the 
individual allocations under established IFQ programs like those for surf 
clams.93  The sector program, however, almost certainly constitutes a 
LAPP.  Because the plaintiffs appeared to focus exclusively on the 
referendum provision, it does not appear that they drew the court’s 
attention to MSA section 1853a(c)(4), “Regional Fishery 
Associations.”94 
Regional fishery associations are a specifically enumerated form of 
limited access privilege program.95  They must “be located within the 
management area of the relevant Council,” which develops criteria 
governing their operation.96  The associations must be voluntary and 
have “established by-laws and operating procedures” and “consist of 
participants in the fishery who hold quota share.”97  Regional fishery 
associations must “develop and submit a . . . plan to the Council and the 
Secretary for approval based on criteria developed by the Council,” and 
these plans must be “published in the Federal Register.”98  Perhaps most 
significantly, the association itself is not “eligible to receive an initial 
allocation of a limited access privilege,” but it may hold those privileges 
which are assigned to its members.99 
The aforementioned discussion fairly describes the sector program.  
Amendment 16 created the framework for establishing these bodies, and 
each sector is responsible for submitting an operations plan that must be 
approved and published in the Federal Register.100  The court itself noted 
that “sectors are ‘temporary, voluntary, fluid associations of vessels.’”101  
The fact that sectors are not issued permits, something the court found 
dispositive, is not a basis for finding that Amendment 16 did not create a 
LAPP, as the MSA’s regional fishery association provision makes clear.  
                                            
 93. See generally Alliance Against IFQs v. Brown, 84 F.3d 343, 345 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 94. 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(c)(4). 
 95. See id. 
 96. Id. §§ 1853a(c)(4)(A)(i), (ii).  Such criteria must also be approved by the 
Secretary and published in the Federal Register.  Id. § 1853a(c)(4)(A)(ii). 
 97. Id. §§ 1853a(c)(4)(A)(iii), (iv). 
 98. Id. § 1853a(c)(4)(A)(vi).   
 99. Id. § 1853a(c)(4)(A)(v). 
 100. See City of New Bedford v. Locke, No. 10–10789-RWZ, 2011 WL 2636863, at 
*1 (D. Mass. June 30, 2011) (describing the program); see also 77 Fed. Reg. 26129 (May 
2, 2012) (publication of sector operation plans for the 2012 groundfish fishing season). 
 101. City of New Bedford, 2011 WL 2636863, at *4 (citations omitted). 
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It appears, rather, that the court conflated the definition of a “limited 
access privilege,” which is a type of permit,102 with a limited access 
privilege program, which only requires the existence of fishery 
participants who hold such a permit.  Had the plaintiffs focused more on 
this aspect, the New Bedford decision may have turned out differently. 
2.  Pacific Dawn, LLC v. Bryson 
Another important aspect of catch share programs—the basis on 
which initial shares of fishing privileges are allocated—was at issue in 
another groundfish case, this time on the west coast.103  Pacific Dawn, 
LLC v. Bryson involved Amendments 20 and 21 to the Pacific 
Groundfish FMP.104  These two interrelated and highly complex sets of 
rules established an IFQ program for groundfish harvesters, shore-side 
and at-sea processors (motherships), and catcher-processing vessels.105  
Of particular concern were the baseline years used to determine 
allocations of Pacific whiting among fishing vessels and processors.106   
Councils often rely on control dates to establish break points for 
determining allocation baselines and even continued qualification for a 
fishery.107  In Pacific Dawn, the court found a council’s failure to 
consider Pacific whiting harvests and processing patterns over a seven 
and six year period, respectively, between issuance of a control date and 
promulgation of an individual fishing quota program utilizing it to be 
unlawful.108  In particular, the court shed additional light on the issue of 
when, if ever, a control date may become “stale” and how councils 
should weigh “current harvest” in allocating fishing privileges under a 
catch share program.109   
The Pacific Council began exploring an IFQ program in 2003.110  In 
order to “discourage increased fishing effort in the limited entry trawl 
fishery based on economic speculation” while the plan was under 
development, the Council established a control date of November 6, 
                                            
 102. See 16 U.S.C. § 1802(26) (2006). 
 103. Pacific Dawn, LLC v. Bryson, No. C10-4828 TEH, 2011 WL 6748501, at *1 
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2011). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id.; see also id. at *2.  
 106. Id. at *4. 
 107. See, e.g., American Pelagic Fishing Co., L.P. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363, 
1367 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 108. Pacific Dawn, 2011 WL 6748501, at *6. 
 109. Id. at *4. 
 110. Id. at *2. 
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2003.111  The notice, published in the Federal Register, was meant to 
warn fishermen and processors that harvests after this date might not be 
considered for purposes of allocating quota shares.112 
Development of the plan proceeded slowly.113  The final rule 
implementing these two amendments was not published until October 1, 
2010, nearly seven years after the control date.114  In the course of 
developing the plan, the Council utilized the 2003 cut-off date for fishing 
vessels, allocating most stocks based on shares of harvest from 1994-
2003.115  However, for allocation of some overfished species, the years 
2003-2006 were used, due to implementation of “rockfish conservation 
areas” that substantially changed fishing patterns.116  For processor 
quotas, the Council used the years 1994 to 2004.117  The one-year 
extension for the processors, which allowed one company long involved 
in the fishery to qualify for a higher percentage of quota, “was the result 
of compromise.”118   
Plaintiffs, groundfish fishermen and processors who would have 
gained a larger share of quota based on more recent history, argued that 
using the 2003/2004 cut off as the basis of allocating Pacific whiting 
violated the MSA.119  The Reauthorization Act required NMFS to 
develop a set of procedures “to ensure fair and equitable initial 
allocations, including consideration of — 
(i)  current and historical harvests; 
(ii)  employment in the harvesting and processing sectors; 
(iii) investments in, and dependence upon, the fishery; and 
                                            
 111. Id. (quoting Fisheries Off West Coast States and in the Western Pacific; Pacific 
Coast Groundfish Fishery; Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking regarding a Trawl 
Individual Quota Program and to Establish a Control Date, 69 Fed. Reg. 1563 (Jan. 9, 
2004) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 600)). 
 112. See Fisheries Off West Coast States and in the Western Pacific; Pacific Coast 
Groundfish Fishery; Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking regarding a Trawl 
Individual Quota Program and to Establish a Control Date, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1563 (to be 
codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 600). 
 113. Pacific Dawn, 2011 WL 6748501, at *4. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at *2. 
 116. Id. at *7 (quoting Decision Memorandum from NOAA Regional Administrator 
William W. Stelle, Jr. to NOAA Assistant Administrator for Fisheries Eric C. Schwabb, 
D45:*66 (Aug. 3, 2010)).  
 117. Id. at *2. 
 118. Id. at *4 n.5. 
 119. Id. at *4. 
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(iv) the current and historical participation of fishing 
communities.”120 
“Plaintiffs contend that Defendants violated subsection (i) of this 
provision—and also failed to base their decisions on ‘the best scientific 
information available,’ as required by National Standard Two . . . by not 
considering [more recent] fishing history.”121 
NMFS relied on two principle arguments.122  One was that the 
NMFS and the Council “adequately considered current harvests by 
allocating quota shares to current permit owners rather than to 
individuals or vessels that may have participated in the fishery in the 
past.”123  This argument was summarily dismissed.124  “[T]he statute 
requires consideration of current harvests, not current permits, and 
considering historical harvests of current permits is distinguishable from 
considering current harvests themselves.”125   
The second, and ultimately self-defeating, argument was that the 
NMFS and the Council did consider more recent harvests for some 
purposes.126  For example, they used the period from 2003 to 2006 to 
allocate certain “overfished” species, because that period “reasonably 
reflected recent fishing patterns,” which had been altered by new 
conservation areas established in 2003 to protect rockfish, “while not 
diverging too far from the target species allocation period of 1994-
2003.”127  The court found that it was rational to consider these more 
recent changes in making allocations of certain species, but that it was 
not rational to fail to conduct a similar analysis for Pacific whiting.128  
The court noted industry-provided information showing similar large 
changes post-2003/2004 in the distribution of whiting harvests and 
processing submitted during the comment period.129  NMFS was faulted 
for failing to point to any evidence in the record “of whether the IFQ 
                                            
 120. Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 109–479, § 106(a)(2), 120 Stat. 3575, 3589 
(2007) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(c)(5)(A)).   
 121. Pacific Dawn, 2011 WL 6748501 at *2 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1851(2)). 
 122. Id. at **4, 7. 
 123. Id. at *4.   
 124. See id. at *8. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at *7. 
 127. Id. (quoting Decision Memorandum from NOAA Regional Administrator William 
W. Stelle, Jr. to NOAA Assistant Administrator for Fisheries Eric C. Schwabb D45:*66). 
 128. See id.   
 129. See id. 
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allocations based on history through 2003 and 2004 ‘reasonably 
reflected’ these more recent fishing patterns.”130   
The court was even more critical of the decision to extend the 
qualification period to 2004 for distribution of processor quotas.131  The 
Council did so “because keeping the date at 2003 was viewed to 
disadvantage a processor that was present as a participant during the 
window period but had increased its share of the processing substantially 
since the close of the original allocation period (2003).”132  The record 
showed that this exception was made on behalf of one processor and was 
adopted pursuant to an agreement among industry participants, to which 
the Council acceded.133  
The record also showed, however, that “five new buyers have 
entered the fishery since 2004.”134  They were denied quota share based 
on NMFS’ and the Council’s reasoning that they accounted for only a 
small portion of the total Pacific whiting processing, and thus would not 
be prejudiced by being denied processing shares.135  Finding no evidence 
that the “new entrants engaged in speculation when they entered the 
market after the announced control date,” the court held that no rational 
basis had been demonstrated for excluding these businesses.136  “[T]he 
extension to 2004 was made to benefit a single processor, which begs the 
question of why that particular processor should benefit—
notwithstanding an earlier control date—when others should not.  This 
appears to be a quintessential case of arbitrariness.”137 The judge was 
also troubled by the fact that this decision was the product of negotiation, 
“thus undermining any argument that Defendants’ decision-making was 
free from political compromise.”138 
In conclusion, the court held: 
                                            
 130. Id. (citation omitted). 
 131. See id.  (“Most problematic is Defendants’ explanation of why the qualifying 
period for processors was extended to 2004.”) 
 132. Id. (quoting June 2010 Final Environmental Impact Statement prepared by the 
Council and NMFS, B22:A–214). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. (quoting June 2010 Final Environmental Impact Statement prepared by the 
Council and NMFS, B22:A–216).   
 135. See id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id.  
 138. Id.  In light of this statement, Judge Henderson’s earlier dismissal of the claim that 
these accommodations constituted an unlawful “political compromise” contrary to the 
MSA’s National Standard 2 is somewhat puzzling.  See id. at *4 (citing Hadaja, Inc. v. 
Evans, 263 F. Supp. 2d 346, 350, 354 (D.R.I. 2003) (overturning tilefish allocation 
scheme based on industry compromise)). 
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While Defendants correctly argue that they have broad discretion 
to make decisions, and that no particular outcome is required by 
the MSA, they have failed to present a reasonable explanation 
for relying on the 2003 control date for some purposes but not 
others.  Consequently, the Court finds that Defendants’ failure to 
consider fishing history beyond 2003 for harvesters and 2004 for 
processors was arbitrary and capricious.139 
Despite the decision not to create a per se rule as to when a control may 
become stale, the court’s strong language will likely be cited in future 
cases where there is a significant lag between a control date and the 
conclusion of the rulemaking process. 
3.  Coastal Conservation Association v. Blank 
The Gulf and New England region ITQ referendum provision140 
provides that any new program is to be decided by a vote of “eligible 
permit holders.”141  “For multispecies permits in the Gulf of Mexico, 
only those participants who have substantially fished the species 
proposed to be included in the individual fishing quota program shall be 
eligible to vote in such a referendum.”142  In Coastal Conservation 
Association, the plaintiff challenged the Gulf Council’s interpretation of 
what it meant to have “substantially fished” for so-called reef fish, 
including such stocks as grouper and tilefish, when it established 
eligibility to participate in a referendum to create a grouper and tilefish 
IFQ program.143 
                                            
 139. Id. at *8.   
 140. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 141. 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(c)(6)(D)(i). 
 142. Id. (emphasis added); see also id. § 1853a(c)(5) (“In developing a limited access 
privilege program to harvest fish a Council or the Secretary shall— . . . (E) authorize limited 
access privileges to harvest fish to be held, acquired, used by, or issued under the system to 
persons who substantially participate in the fishery, including in a specific sector of such 
fishery, as specified by the Council.”) (emphasis added).  Unlike the New England Council, 
the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council (“Gulf Council”) does not have a 
“multispecies” FMP.  Congress appears to have intended to mean the Gulf Council’s Reef 
Fish FMP, which covers a multitude of snapper, grouper, and like species.  See Gulf of 
Mexico Fishery Management Council, Reef Fish Management Plans, 
http://www.gulfcouncil.org/fishery_management_plans/reef_fish_management.php (last 
visited Aug. 1, 2012). 
 143. Coastal Conservation Ass’n v. Blank, Nos.2:09-cv-641-Ftm-29SPC, 2:10-cv-95-
Ftm-29SPC, 2011 WL 4530544, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 2011). 
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The importance of being qualified to vote carries with it not only the 
ability to decide how an individual wishes his or her fishery to be 
managed, but also whether one will have the continued right to 
participate in the future LAPP-governed fishery at all.  In this case, the 
council decided that in order to have “substantially fished” for purposes 
of the referendum, one has to have “landed 8,000 pounds of grouper 
and/or tilefish per permit within each of the years between 1999 and 
2004, with the ability to drop one year . . . .”144  Plaintiffs were fishermen 
excluded by these criteria. 
The crux of their argument was that the term “substantially fished” 
had a plain meaning and that NMFS’ interpretation, as codified in the 
regulations,145 was unworthy of deference under Chevron.146  Further, the 
fishermen argued that the NMFS and the Council impermissibly applied 
MSA’s requirements for determining eligibility in the context of the reef 
fish IFQ program.147   
The court, reasonably in our view, disagreed that the term 
“substantially fished” was clear in its meaning and proceeded with the 
Chevron analysis on that basis.148   
Chevron set up a two-step framework for evaluating whether a 
court must defer to an agency’s construction of a statute it is 
charged with administering. Deference from the court is due if 
(1) Congress has not spoken directly on the precise question at 
issue and its intent is unclear, and (2) the agency’s interpretation 
is based on a permissible construction of the statute.149   
Having found the meaning of the term unclear, the court then agreed that 
NMFS’ regulatory interpretation of “substantially fished” and its 
application in this case was reasonable, denying the fishermen’s 
claims.150 
The regulations setting forth the Gulf IFQ referendum voter 
eligibility contain the following, non-exclusive considerations for 
determining if a permit holder meets the “substantially fished” standard: 
                                            
 144. Id. 
 145. See 50 C.F.R. § 600.1310 (2009). 
 146. Coastal Conservation Ass’n, 2011 WL 4530544, at *8. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at *9. 
 149. Id. (quoting In re MDL1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d 1160, 1193 
(11th Cir. 2011)). 
 150. Id. at *10. 
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(i) Current and historical harvest and participation in the 
fishery; 
(ii) The economic value of and employment practices in the 
fishery; and 
(iii) Any other factors determined by the Council with 
jurisdiction over the fishery for which an IFQ program is 
proposed to be relevant to the fishery and the proposed IFQ 
program.151 
The council factors, noted in subparagraph (iii), “may include, but are 
not limited to, levels of participation or reliance on the fishery as 
represented by landings, sales, expenditures, or other considerations.  A 
Council may also apply the same criteria for weighting eligible 
referendum votes.”152  These considerations are similar to the MSA’s 
criteria for establishing a general limited access program153 and those 
specifically enumerated in the LAPP provision.154  It is therefore 
unsurprising that the court in Coastal Conservation Association upheld 
their validity. 
It is difficult to imagine what other factors would assist the Council 
in drawing a line between those active participants relying on a fishery, 
and those participants that fall short, and the line being tied to a 
“substantially fished” standard.  Experience suggests that these plaintiffs 
may likely have preferred to see more emphasis on the National Standard 
8 focus on sustaining the participation of fishing communities.155  Catch 
share programs like the grouper/tilefish IFQ are controversial in large 
part because people with some demonstrated reliance on or participation 
in a fishery are excluded, while those making the cut obtain a valuable 
allocation.156  Fewer vessels mean fewer crew jobs and support services 
provided in coastal communities.   
The criteria used in the Gulf reef fish referendum makes this clear.  
The 8,000-pound per year criterion qualified fishermen accounting for 
about ninety percent of the grouper and tilefish landings over the 
baseline period.157  However, these fishermen accounted for only thirty-
                                            
 151. 50 C.F.R. § 600.1310(c)(3). 
 152. Id. § 600.1310(d). 
 153. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(b)(6). 
 154. Id. § 1853a(c)(5). 
 155. See id. § 1851(a)(8). 
 156. See Carroll, supra note 41, at 175-76; see also Peter Schikler, Has Congress Made 
It Harder to Save the Fish? An Analysis of the Limited Access Privilege Program (LAPP) 
Provisions of The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management 
Reauthorization Act of 2006, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 908, 915-16 (2008-2009). 
 157. Coastal Conservation Ass’n, 2011 WL 4530544, at *10. 
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one percent of all reef fish permit holders.158  The other sixty-nine 
percent will have to buy quota shares in order to harvest these species in 
the future.159  This may be considered a harsh result, but the Gulf 
Council’s decision here is typical of those councils that have had to wait 
for decades when determining who qualifies for permits in fisheries to 
which access has been limited.160   
Catch shares can raise the stakes of these decisions, both for 
managers and the industry, but the need to make such choices is a 
consequence of MSA’s conservation requirements.  Limiting harvest 
inevitably involves making an allocation decision—even keeping a 
quota-limited fishery open to all entrants entails an allocation, such as to 
the swiftest and most powerful vessels.161  Having an objective and 
reasonably clear set of standards on which to base qualification decisions 
provides fishermen with some sense of the “rules of the road” and is a 
more effective means of participating in the management process. 
B.  Meaning and Extent of ACLs and AMs 
1.  Oceana, Inc. v. Locke 
As previously mentioned, the addition of ACLs and AMs has been 
one of the more contentious aspects of the Reauthorization Act, as well 
as a ripe field for litigation.162  Oceana, Inc. v. Locke revolved around 
Amendment 16 to the New England Council’s Northeast Multispecies 
FMP.  The court examined the relationship between the new ACL/AM 
provision and the existing requirement that each FMP “establish a 
standardized bycatch reporting methodology” or SBRM.163  Amendment 
16 was, in part, designed to satisfy §104(a)(10) of the Reauthorization 
                                            
 158. Id. 
 159. See id. 
 160. “A limited access scheme restricts the number of vessels allowed to fish in a 
particular fishery with the goal of ending overfishing and rebuilding the fish population.”  
Hadaja, Inc. v. Evans, 263 F. Supp. 2d 346, 349-50 (D.R.I. 2003).  Limited access is not 
synonymous with catch shares, it is a distinct tool long used to limit effort in a fishery for 
conservation purposes.  See generally LIMITED ENTRY AS A FISHERY MANAGEMENT TOOL: 
PROCEEDINGS OF A NATIONAL CONFERENCE TO CONSIDER LIMITED ENTRY AS A TOOL IN 
FISHERY MANAGEMENT (R. Bruce Rettig & Jay J.C. Ginter eds., 1978), cited in Seth 
Macinko, Fishing Communities as Special Places: The Problems and Promise of Place in 
Contemporary Fisheries Management, 13 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 71, 78 n.21 (2007-
2008). 
 161. See 16 U.S.C. § 1853(b)(6). 
 162. See Introduction supra pp. 2-3. 
 163. Oceana, Inc. v. Locke, 831 F. Supp. 2d 95, 107 (D.D.C. 2011).  
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Act, requiring councils to “‘establish a mechanism for specifying annual 
catch limits [ACLs] . . . at a level such that overfishing does not occur in 
the fishery, including measures to ensure accountability’ with those 
limits.”164  In relevant part, Oceana challenged Amendment 16 on two 
grounds: “Amendment 16’s mechanism for monitoring compliance with 
ACLs and its alleged lack of AMs for certain species.”165  With respect to 
the former, Oceana argued that NMFS had violated both the SBRM and 
ACL requirements by failing to include in Amendment 16 “a bycatch-
reporting methodology (as required by § (a)(11)) capable of monitoring 
compliance with ACLs (as required by § (a)(15)).”166 
The court found that nothing in the statutory text requires FMPs to 
“include a bycatch-reporting methodology designed to do the work of 
monitoring and enforcing ACLs.”167  To hold otherwise would 
inappropriately “fus[e] these two distinct requirements into a new 
obligation that is not actually part of the Act.”168  The court honed in on 
the fact that Congress used two distinct words in ACL/AM and SBRM 
provisions: “measures” in the former and “methodology” in the latter.169  
Canons of statutory construction require that the words be interpreted to 
mean separate things because they serve distinct purposes.170  The court 
explained that subsection (a)(11)’s “methodology” was designed to 
“produce[] annual fishery-wide assessments of bycatch that benefit from 
high-quality data gathered over a long period of time.”171  Subsection 
(a)(15), on the other hand, “requires in-season bycatch reports to measure 
discards in real time” to determine whether ACLs have been exceeded in 
                                            
 164. Id. at 104 (alteration in original) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(15)). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 107 (emphasis omitted).  In a previous case, Oceana had successfully 
challenged the Northeast Multispecies Plan for failing to establish an SBRM.  See 
Oceana, Inc. v. Evans, 384 F. Supp. 2d 203, 232 (D.D.C. 2005).  It also succeeded in 
overturning the Omnibus SBRM Amendment promulgated by NMFS to address this 
finding on the grounds that the agency had too much discretion to implement its terms.  
Oceana, Inc. v. Locke, 670 F.3d 1238, 1243 (D.C. Cir. 2011).  In the Amendment 16 
case, Oceana again tried to litigate the failure to establish an SBRM, but the Court found 
it “can provide no further relief because the SBRM Amendment has already been 
remanded” and NMFS was in the process of complying with the Circuit Court’s order.  
Oceana, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 114. 
 167. Oceana, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 108. 
 168. Id. at 109 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).   
 169. Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. §§ 1853(a)(11), (15) (2006)). 
 170. See id. at 108 (citing Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., Inc., 534 U.S. 438, 452 
(2002)). 
 171. Id. at 109 (citations omitted).   
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a given year.172  The court ultimately held that a “FMP is sufficient so 
long as it independently complies with [subsections] (a)(15) and 
(a)(11).”173 
The interplay between accountability measures and bycatch 
monitoring, however, presented another question.174  The definition of 
catch includes both fish that are retained and bycatch.175  Bycatch must 
be accurately assessed to ensure ACLs are not exceeded because bycatch 
counts against a stock’s catch limits.176  Bycatch, therefore, must be 
monitored to comply with both subsections (a)(11) and (a)(15).177  The 
question is: what level of monitoring is sufficient to comply with both 
requirements? 
Oceana argued that Amendment 16 failed to allocate at-sea observers 
“at a level higher than that required under the [vacated Northeast Region] 
SBRM Amendment.”178  To monitor bycatch, the SBRM Amendment 
required government-funded, on-board observers to monitor bycatch 
discards of fishing vessels at sea to ensure sufficient data is collected to 
meet delineated performance standards.179  Oceana argued in this case 
that the Amendment 16’s bycatch monitoring provisions, which it 
alleged relied on the SBRM, were “inadequate to monitor compliance 
with ACLs.”180 
The court held that “an FMP need not necessarily mandate a specific 
level of observer coverage.”181  Instead, all that the FMP must do to 
satisfy the law “is require bycatch monitoring adequate to support 
measures to ensure accountability with ACLs.”182   
Although the court found that Amendment 16 does not require a set 
level of observer coverage, its monitoring provisions were nonetheless 
sufficient.183  As the court noted, 
                                            
 172. Id. (citation omitted). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 110. 
 175. Id. (citing 50 C.F.R. § 600.310(f)(2)(i) (2011)).  “The term ‘bycatch’ means fish 
which are harvested in a fishery, but which are not sold or kept for personal use, and 
includes economic discards and regulatory discards. Such term does not include fish 
released alive under a recreational catch and release fishery management program.”  16 
U.S.C. § 1802(2) (2006). 
 176. Oceana, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 110. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. See 73 Fed. Reg. 4736, 4738 (Jan. 28, 2008).   
 180. Oceana, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 110. 
 181. Id. at 111.   
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 112. 
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Amendment 16 provides: For observer or at-sea monitor 
coverage, minimum coverage levels must meet the coefficient of 
variation in the [SBRM Amendment].  The required levels of 
coverage will be set by NMFS based on information provided by 
the Northeast Fisheries Science Center (NEFSC) and may 
consider factors other than the SBRM CV standard when 
determining appropriate levels.184 
This provision was determined to be both mandatory and sufficiently 
detailed to satisfy the requirements of subsection (a)(15) because it 
“require[d] that bycatch be accurately reported throughout the fishing 
season at levels such that ACLs can be monitored and enforced.”185   
Oceana also addressed whether accountability measures are 
necessary where a zero allocation has been given for a species.186  In this 
case, sector vessels were subject to sub-ACLs and sub-AMs for most 
stocks with the exception of five (“[Atlantic] halibut, ocean pout, 
windowpane flounder, Atlantic wolffish, and SNE/MA winter 
flounder”).187  For these five stocks, the groundfish sectors did not 
receive any annual catch entitlement.188   
Because the sector vessels were prohibited from retaining any fish 
from these five stocks, it was unclear how to interpret the lack of an 
allocation.189  Oceana interpreted it as if the sector’s sub-ACL was 
zero.190  Reasoning from this position, Oceana contended that because a 
sub-ACL existed (albeit for zero fish), there must also be accompanying 
sub-AMs.191  In short, the argument is that Amendment 16 lacks 
                                            
 184. Id. at 113 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).   
 185. Id. at 111. 
 186. Id. at 114-15.  In other words, sustainable catch levels consistent with the 
rebuilding requirements for such species are so low as to not allow for any directed 
harvest such that a prohibition on retention and landing is warranted.  See id. 
 187. Id. at 115.  The National Standard 1 guidelines allow for what it calls “sector-
ACLs,” here called “sub-ACLs,” when a fishery contains “distinct user group[s] to which 
separate management strategies and separate catch quotas apply.”  50 C.F.R. § 
600.310(f)(5)(ii) (2011).  As noted above, Amendment 16 created two distinct classes, 
sectors and a “common pool.”  See City of New Bedford v. Locke, No. 10–10789-RWZ, 
2011 WL 2636863, at *2 (D. Mass. June 30, 2011).  “It also allocated sub-ACLs—e.g., 
portions of each stock’s total ACL—to the common pool and sectors.”  Oceana, 831 F. 
Supp. 2d at 115 (citations omitted).  Oceana challenged the failure of NMFS to establish 
“sub-AMs” for the sectors.  See id. at 115-18. 
 188. Oceana, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 115. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
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measures to ensure accountability in the event that groundfish sectors’ 
incidental catch of the five species causes their ACL to be exceeded.192 
On this point the court agreed, explaining,  
[T]he fact that the five species may not be retained, and are thus 
unlikely to be targeted by fishermen, does not mean that they 
will not accidentally be caught and subsequently discarded.  
Since the “catch” limited by ACLs includes both fish that are 
retained (landed) and bycatch that are discarded at sea, the ACLs 
for the five stocks may be exceeded by accumulation of bycatch 
alone.193    
It also based its decision on NMFS’ own interpretation of this issue, as 
expressed in the National Standards guidelines.194  Having been 
implemented through full notice and comment rulemaking, the court 
found the guidelines deserving of considerable deference.195  Relevant to 
this issue, the court agreed with the guidelines’ interpretation “that sub-
AMs are not mandatory so long as Amendment 16 establishes an overall 
suite of accountability measures sufficient to prevent overfishing of each 
of the five stocks as a whole.”196  The court found, however, that NMFS 
did not.197   
Under Amendment 16, the common pool fishery ends when its 
allocation of the five stocks at issue is projected to be met, and any 
overages are deducted from the following year’s allocation.198  The court 
found “that adjusting fishing-input or -output controls for the common 
pool alone will be insufficient to protect these five stocks from 
overfishing.”199 The court also rejected NMFS’ argument that the 
“management measures [governing sectors . . . ] function as prospective 
sub-AMs for the five species.”200 While the court agreed that appropriate 
management measures could “function as ‘prospective’ AMs” so long as 
they help ensure that overfishing does not occur, it found in this case that 
                                            
 192. Id. at 116. 
 193. Id. at 115-16 (citation omitted). 
 194. See 16 U.S.C. § 1851(b) (2006) (directing the Secretary to “establish advisory 
guidelines (which shall not have the force and effect of law), based on the national 
standards, to assist in the development of fishery management plans”). See also 50 C.F.R. 
§ 600.310 (2011) (the National Standard One guidelines). 
 195. Oceana, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 117 (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 
218, 228 (2001); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944)). 
 196. Oceana, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 117. (emphasis in original). 
 197. Id. at 118. 
 198. Id. at 118, n.3. 
 199. Id. at 118 (citations omitted). 
 200. Id. (citation omitted). 
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the management controls would not achieve that end.201  Most 
importantly, the court held: “NMFS’s Guidelines indicate that while in-
season AMs like the ones established by Amendment 16 for the five 
stocks are appropriate and even recommended, AMs for when an ACL is 
exceeded are mandatory . . . .”202 
This is a strong holding, one to which Councils and NMFS will 
likely adhere when deciding when and how to establish sub-ACLs for 
various segments of a particular fishery.  When no allocation is made, or 
where ACLs are set at zero, it is clear that AMs still must be put in place 
to ensure that any catch (bycatch or landings) do not exceed whatever 
low catch threshold is necessary to rebuild such stocks.203  This will 
prove to be challenging.  When no allocation of a particular stock of fish 
is made, it is generally, like the five species at issue in Oceana, because 
the stocks are severely depleted.204  Instituting ACLs and AMs for such 
stocks typically means that the harvest of other, healthier stocks caught 
in association will be foregone.205  These low-allocation stocks are 
known as “choke species” for this very reason, and currently, the New 
England region is plagued with many such stocks in addition to the 
aforementioned five.206  
The other major holding of Oceana, relating to the need for an FMP 
to include some level of monitoring as an adjunct to the Reauthorization 
Act’s new ACL and AM provisions, will likely be influential.207 
Undoubtedly, this is another issue that will be tested again judicially.208 
2.  Flaherty v. Bryson 
Before any other decisions can be made, the council and NMFS must 
define what exactly they are going to manage.  In the case of the MSA, 
that decision comes in the form of defining the “fishery.”209 The MSA 
                                            
 201. Id. at 119 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 600.310(g)(2) (2011) & 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(15) 
(2006)). 
 202. Id. at 119-120 (emphasis added). 
 203. See 50 C.F.R. § 600.310(g) 
 204. See, e.g., Oceana, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 119. 
 205. See Mark Schrope, Fisheries: What’s the Catch?, 465 NATURE 3 (2010).  
 206. See id. 
 207. See generally Oceana, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 95. 
 208. Indeed, in Oceana’s present case challenging the Mid-Atlantic Council’s Omnibus 
ACL/AM Amendment, supra note 5, the issue of what level, if any, of in-season 
monitoring is required is one of the issues raised.   
 209. See 16 U.S.C. § 1852(h)(1) (2006) (“Each Council shall, . . . for each fishery 
under its authority that requires conservation and management, prepare and submit” 
FMPs and amendments to such FMPs “that are necessary.”). 
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defines a “fishery” as “one or more stocks of fish which can be treated as 
a unit for purposes of conservation and management and which are 
identified on the basis of geographical, scientific, technical, recreational, 
and economic characteristics.”210  A “stock of fish” is “a species, 
subspecies, geographical grouping, or other category of fish capable of 
management as a unit.”211  The Council determines which “target stocks” 
(fish that are deliberately caught), and/or “non-target stocks” (fish that 
are incidentally caught) to include in the fishery.212  “Once a fish is 
designated as a ‘stock in the fishery’ the Council must develop 
conservation and management measures, including ACLs and AMs, for 
that stock.”213  Put another way, any stock managed by an FMP is said to 
be a stock in the fishery.214 
Plaintiffs in Flaherty v. Bryson challenged Amendment 4 to the 
Atlantic Herring FMP, alleging that a distinctly different species, the 
river herring, was unlawfully excluded as a stock in the fishery.215  The 
Atlantic sea herring fishery has been managed as the only stock in the 
Atlantic herring FMP since 1999.216  These herring are distinguishable 
from “river herring” because they spend their entire lives at sea, instead 
of spawning in rivers as their anadromous counterparts do.217  River 
herring mix with Atlantic herring during their time at sea, and are 
incidentally caught with Atlantic herring.218   
In 2009, the Council initiated Amendment 4 to the FMP as a means 
of bringing the plan into compliance with the Reauthorization Act’s new 
requirements.219  Because Atlantic herring were not subject to 
                                            
 210. Id. § 1802(13).   
 211. Id. § 1802(42).   
 212. 50 C.F.R. § 600.310(d)(1), (3)-(4) (2011).   
 213. Flaherty v. Bryson, 850 F. Supp. 2d 38, 50 (D.D.C. 2012) (citations omitted). 
 214. Id. at 58 n.9 (citation omitted). 
 215. Id. at 58.  In fact, “river herring” are actually four different species which are 
referred to in the collective: “(1) blueback herring (Alosa aestivalis), (2) alewife (Alosa 
pseudoharengus), (3) American shad (Alosa sapidissima), and (4) hickory shad (Alosa 
mediocris).”  Id. at 45 (citation omitted).  Parenthetically, on November 2, 2011, NMFS 
made a 90-day finding under the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A), 
that a petition to list two of these species, alewife and blueback herring, “presents 
substantial scientific information indicating the petitioned action may be warranted,” and 
initiated a status review.  76 Fed. Reg. 67652, 67652 (Nov. 2, 2011). 
 216. See New England Fishery Management Council, Atlantic Herring Fishery 
Management Plan, available at http://www.nefmc.org/herring/summary/herring.pdf.  The 
original herring FMP was adopted in 1978, but that plan was rescinded in 1982 in favor 
of state regulation of the resource.  Id. 
 217. Flaherty, 850 F. Supp. 2d at 45. 
 218. Id.  
 219. Id. 
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overfishing, the MSA required the Council to update the FMP so that it 
complied with ACL and AM requirements by 2011.220  Due to a lengthy 
plan development process, the Council deferred a host of other difficult 
measures, including “measures to address river herring bycatch,” to a 
subsequent amendment.221  This action was the subject of dispute in 
Flaherty.222 
The court ultimately agreed with plaintiffs’ contention that the 
Council’s decision to exclude river herring was arbitrary and capricious 
and unsupported by the record, finding that ACLs and AMs are required 
for “all stocks in need of conservation and management, not just for 
those stocks that are part of the fishery prior to passage of the 
[Reauthorization Act].”223  This holding was premised on a textual 
reading of the MSA, along with the National Standard One guidelines.224   
[I]n developing an FMP, the Council must decide which species 
or other categories of fish are capable of management as a unit, 
and therefore should be included in the fishery and managed 
together in the plan.  This decision entails two basic 
determinations.  The Council must decide (1) which stocks “can 
be treated as a unit for purposes of conservation and 
management” and therefore should be considered a “fishery” and 
(2) which fisheries “require conservation and management.225 
In holding that NMFS and the Council unlawfully failed to explain the 
exclusion of river herring as a stock in the fishery in Amendment 4, the 
court rejected NMFS’ arguments that (1) the statutory deadline for 
implementing herring ACLs and AMs necessitated deferring 
consideration of the addition of river herring and (2) that NMFS 
reasonably deferred to the Council’s reasoned decision.226 
As to the first, the court found no basis in the record for not 
addressing the issue “when the Council had more than four years to meet 
the statutory deadline for fishing year 2011.”227  “Defendants must 
provide some meaningful explanation as to why it was not possible to 
consider which stocks, other than Atlantic herring, should be subject to 
the ACLs and AMs which are so central to effective fishery management 
                                            
 220. Id.  
 221. Id. at 46 (citation omitted). 
 222. Id.   
 223. Id. at 52.   
 224. See id. at 43-44. 
 225. Id. at 51 (quoting 16 U.S.C. §§ 1802(13), 1852(h)(1)).  
 226. Id. at 51. 
 227. Id. at 52. 
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and avoidance of overfishing.”228   The court also faulted the agency for 
failing to explain “why the information in the Administrative Record 
cited by Plaintiffs was deemed insufficient to justify including river 
herring as a stock . . . or to permit setting at least an interim Acceptable 
Biological Catch limit for the species . . . .”229   
As to the second argument, NMFS stated that “river herring were not 
designated as a stock in the fishery because the Council decided to 
include only target stocks in the fishery, and river herring is a non-target 
stock.”230  The agency argued that, short of a clear violation of law, it 
must “defer to the Council’s determination of what stocks are in the 
fishery . . . .”231  The court, however, held that it is NMFS’ 
“responsibility to decide whether an FMP, including the composition of 
its fishery, satisfies the goals and language of the MSA.”232  While 
NMFS may defer to a council’s “policy choices,” the agency “must make 
its own assessment of whether the Council’s determination as to which 
stocks can be managed as a unit and require conservation and 
management is reasonable.”233  The court found that NMFS failed to 
make this inquiry it found required, a failure that “does not demonstrate 
reasoned decision-making.”234 
The court’s reasoning in reaching this decision is subject to some 
criticism.  It appears that the Council and NMFS mostly erred in initially 
considering measures to reduce river herring bycatch, but then changing 
course and limiting Amendment 4 solely to addressing herring ACLs and 
AMs.235  The court’s decision, that it was arbitrary and capricious to have 
failed to more thoroughly consider including river herring as a “stock in 
the fishery” and setting ACLs and AMs for that stock, was largely 
predicated on the MSA’s definition of “fishery” and “stock of fish.”236  
There is no doubt that as river herring are incidentally harvested in the 
sea herring fishery (as well as others), they could be considered part of 
that “fishery.”  However, the National Standard One guidelines authorize 
                                            
 228. Id. at 52-53 (citing NetCoalition v. SEC, 615 F.3d 525, 539 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). 
 229. Id. at 53. 
 230. Id. (citing Defs.’ Mot. 17). 
 231. Id. (citing Defs.’ Mot. 15-16). 
 232. Id. at 54 (citing N.C. Fisheries Ass’n, Inc. v. Gutierrez, 518 F. Supp. 2d 62, 71–72 
(D.D.C. 2007)).  
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 236. Id. at 51 (quoting 16 U.S.C. §§ 1802(13), (42)). See also notes 157-158, and 
accompanying text. 
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a council to make the determination as to “which specific target stocks 
and/or non-target stocks to include in a fishery.”237  Flaherty appears to 
go too far in removing that discretion from the councils. 
This is particularly true in the case of river herring.  As quoted 
above, the MSA requires the development of an FMP “for each fishery 
under its authority that requires conservation and management.”238  River 
herring, as an anadromous fish principally found in state waters during 
key portions of its lifecycle, falls under the authority of the Atlantic 
States Marine Fisheries Commission (“ASMFC”), which has its own 
FMP for the stock.239  Furthermore, the MSA has a specific provision 
giving councils the discretion to investigate the “effect which the 
conservation and management measures of the plan will have on the 
stocks of naturally spawning anadromous fish in the region.”240  Thus, 
the law provides a specific (and non-mandatory) means of addressing 
incidental river herring bycatch via a means far short of adding such 
species to an FMP.  While these points appear not to have been raised by 
NMFS in this case, the lack of deference to the Council’s and NMFS’ 
determination as to the definition of the appropriate management unit is 
somewhat disconcerting. 
As a result of Flaherty, when information exists that species are 
being targeted or caught incidentally as bycatch, the Council and NMFS 
will feel compelled to determine whether to include that stock in the 
fishery, first by assessing whether that stock can be treated as a unit for 
purposes of management and conservation, and second by determining 
whether that stock requires conservation and management.241  In this 
regard, the Flaherty decision will likely create some confusion over the 
proper management plan under which a bycatch must be managed.  
Councils will have to decide how much bycatch of a given species will 
require that it be included as a stock in the fishery, regardless of how 
small the catch may be, or if the bycatch must be sizeable enough to 
warrant management. 
                                            
 237. 50 C.F.R. § 600.310(d)(1). 
 238. Flaherty, 850 F. Supp. 2d at 43 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1852(h)(1) (emphasis 
added)).   
 239. See Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission, Managed Species: Shad and 
River Herring, http://www.asmfc.org/shadRiverHerring.htm (last visited July 30, 2012).  
The ASMFC is an interstate compact organization designed to coordinate fisheries 
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 240. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(b)(9). 
 241. See Flaherty, 850 F. Supp. 2d at 38.   
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C.  Cases Addressing Other Reauthorization Act Issues 
These cases are by no means exhaustive of the issue raised by the 
Reauthorization Act’s new provisions.  For instance, that Act’s provision 
requiring improved collection of the amount and type of fish harvested 
by recreational anglers was at issue in The Fishing Rights Alliance, Inc. 
v. NMFS.242  Plaintiffs in that case argued that NMFS’ failure to timely 
meet the Reauthorization Act’s January 1, 2009 deadline for creating an 
improved data collection program and registry of fishery participants 
should essentially estop the agency “from basing closures on data 
Congress expressly found was no longer useful.”243  While the new data 
collection program was not operative by the deadline, the court avoided 
the issue of whether a failure in this regard warranted vacation of the 
challenged management measures by finding that NMFS had taken 
sufficient steps towards implementation in a timely manner.244 
In terms of the Reauthorization Act’s heightened social and 
economic protections, no decisions have thoroughly examined the 
meaning or extent of the changes in the law.245  The one case that did 
make a substantive decision relating to the fishery impact statement, 
Coastal Conservation Association,246 did not examine the scope of this 
provision in any great detail.  Rather, the case is noteworthy for its 
holding that subsection 1853(a)(9) of MSA, requiring each FMP to 
contain a “fishery impact statement,”247 “provides an independent basis 
for [a] challenge” to that FMP.248  In other words, a councils’ or NMFS’ 
failure to comply with either the substantive or procedural requirements 
in subsection 1853(a)(9) is grounds for finding an FMP unlawful. 
The court in Coastal Conservation Ass’n outlined some of the 
considerations that would be involved in a review of a fishery impact 
statement.249  First, the court stated “in cases where the substance of the 
decision [e.g., the sufficiency of the analysis in the impact statement] is 
                                            
 242. No. 8:09-CV-00916-T-30AEP, No. 8:09-CV-01544-T-30AEP, No. 8:09-CV-
02265-T-30AEP, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100031 at **30-31 (M.D. Fla. July 15, 2011) 
(citing 73 Fed. Reg. 79705, 79705 (Dec. 30, 2008)). 
 243. Id. at *39 (quoting Dkt. No. 33 at 6). 
 244. See id. at *46. 
 245. For a discussion of these changes, see supra Part II.A. 
 246. See Coastal Conservation Ass’n v. Blank, Nos. 2:09–cv–641–FtM–29SPC, 2:10–
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 247. See supra notes 26-30, and accompanying text. 
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 249. Id. at *6 
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at issue, a court gives deference to a final agency decision.”250  This is 
not the Chevron deference given to the agency’s interpretation of statutes 
it is charged with administering,251 but rather the deference a court will 
give an agency, acting “within its area of expertise, at the frontiers of 
science[,]” to its scientific determinations.252  That is to say, with a great 
deal of deference.  When, as in Coastal Conservation Ass’n, the issue is 
whether the agency “followed the proper procedures in reaching [its] 
decision[,]” the court undertook a de novo review.253 
In this case, the plaintiffs alleged that NMFS violated subsection 
1853(a)(9) by failing “to consider the effect of Amendment 29 on the 
entire fishery [and] failed to consider its effect on the recreational fishing 
sector . . . .”254  Recall from the discussion above that the management 
plan at issue involved the development of a grouper/tilefish IFQ for Gulf 
of Mexico commercial fishermen.255  As it did not change the allocation 
between the recreational and commercial sectors, nor did it affect overall 
harvest limits, the impact assessment concluded that the amendment 
“does ‘not present many potential impacts to the recreational sector.’”256  
Obviously, the plaintiffs felt otherwise, and the impacts they perceived 
were not captured in the fishery impact statement. 
The amendment did “not contain a specifically identified section 
addressing 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(9).”257  However, the court accepted the 
government’s argument that the fishery impact statement requirement 
could be met by containing analysis of the issue – here recreational 
sector impacts – anywhere scattered about the amendment’s voluminous 
final environmental impact statement and even by incorporating other 
documents by reference.258 
While this case likely did not present the best set of facts for testing 
how rigorously courts will hold the councils and NMFS to the letter of 
the Reauthorization Act-strengthened social and economic provisions, 
the holding is not encouraging.  A similar holding was made in a very 
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cursory fashion in City of New Bedford v. Locke.259  Thus far, courts are 
not according the new procedural requirements the same type of “hard 
look” review applied to NEPA analyses.260  
V.  CONCLUSION 
The process of untangling the meaning of the new Reauthorization 
Act provisions is far from over.  At this early stage, however, 
environmental organizations, particularly Oceana, Inc., have been both 
more active and more successful in litigation.  This may be explained, at 
least in part, by the observation that such organizations tend to focus 
more on overarching conservation issues than the details of particular 
fisheries.  That is to say, such groups may find it more important to 
establish the principle that reactive accountability measures are 
mandatory for all fisheries than simply trying to show that they are 
needed for the Atlantic halibut fishery in particular.  Fishermen and the 
organizations that represent them have the opposite concern.  Again, to 
generalize, they are most concerned about their particular fishery and the 
impacts of the management measures imposed by an FMP or amendment 
upon it.  They care what area may be closed to harvest next year if the 
Atlantic halibut ACL is exceeded this year.  In short, environmental 
groups can choose their cases, while the industry’s cases choose them. 
But it has been ever thus.  The battle to define the Reauthorization 
Act’s terms will continue and courts will continue to provide clarity 
where Congress failed to do so.  At some point in the not too distant 
future, Congress will take up Magnuson-Stevens Act reauthorization 
again, and it will again have its say on the next stage of evolution of our 
nation’s fishery management system.   
 
 
                                            
 259. See No. 10-10789-RWZ, 2011 WL 2636863, at *6 (D. Mass. June 30, 2011). 
 260. See, e.g., American Oceans Campaign v. Daley, 183 F. Supp. 2d 1, 19 (D.D.C. 
2000). 
